

## GATSOS' POETICS IN ARISTOTLE'S TOOLS DEFUSES THE DOGMA OF POLITICAL MYTH

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(Abstract)

N. Gatsos, in a mythological grammar of historical and artistic good, wishes to protect artistic and historical values; alas in vain. This outlook is located within the history of Plato's, Aristotle's and Canetti's ideas. Plato has already stressed the magico-religious bond between the language of myth and the incantations of a pythagorean or orphic origin to heal the political evils. Juxtaposing Gatsos' incantatory use of the language of myth with Leibniz' theory, we shall see the manifold significance of art and myth as they produce the intertwined structural opposition of body-mind. K. Palamas' and G. Theotokas' accounts of such a significance foreshadow Gatsos' sounding theory on "The sun remains black and the clear sky remains unreal; freedom's lily flower is given to luckless friends in bitterness. We may thus kneel on the slopes of pain and weep for the victims death consumes". Revolutions in art and history are rare. The whole business here for measuring the results of the efficiency of mythological language regarding the protection of values is dismal. This is Aristotle's greatest lesson we should be viewing with gratitude.

### I. Gatsos' Poetics (an outlook)

The material of art and history, material which is myth, cannot constitute an alibi for arbitrarily exercising political power. Our political mother tongue spells power instead of taming it, N. Gatsos, the Greek poet, translator and lyricist (1911-1992), confesses in his poem *My mother Hellas (a Monkey Gipsy)* in his vain attempt to defuse the dogma of political myth.

"Our mother Hellas has a big mouth to feed us instead of real milk".<sup>1</sup>

There we have the dream of a dream that is so illusory that it entails the undermining of social and historical truth. It is in the dialogue *Phaedrus* that Plato demonstrates the apotropaic function of myth through repetition of an incantation, the myth in this case being the history of Helen of Troy. He focuses on this event's "not being true" as regards both Helen's embarkation and her arrival at the Acropolis of Troy, about which the poet Stesichorus (Sicily, 632-555) wrote a palinode. Probably Plato and Stesichorus alike follow history; not the myth of Phaedrus or the Egyptian ones. But the morals that condition those histories of Alcibiades and Helen constitute the true function of these incantations. Gatsos uses such platonic incantatory procedures to heal<sup>2</sup> social and political evils of his time and repel the evil of passion –avoid slipping into such arbitrariness. This faulty understanding can be seen in the image of Dio, who is said to have seduced Plato, leading him fatally into maniac despair.<sup>3</sup> We can understand in Plato's Works the bond between oral speech and rhythm, melody and orchestral movement, as this bond stems from the primitive societies. This bond is magico-religious in origin, and it summons the assistance of a deity or a mortal. It was disguised further in the singing language under the forms of myths.<sup>4</sup>

We see here that politics solely can substantiate attempts to defuse power, paradoxically, through the use of a material reductionist

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<sup>1</sup> Gatsos 1998, 343.

<sup>2</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 200. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 243. Giouli 2021, 43-59.

<sup>3</sup> Nussbaum 1986, 200.

<sup>4</sup> Moutsopoulos 2012, 158. Moutsopoulos 2009, 85. Giouli 2019a, 327-340.

language. The best possible way for doing this is through myths, in which language is used in order to depict facts. The language of myth is empty of concepts: concepts simply “impress themselves” through the substratum of language in order to materialise history and thus maintain social and political bonds intact.

## II. *Gatsos' position in the history of ideas*

Plato<sup>5</sup> has already stressed the magico-religious bond between the language of myth and the incantations of a pythagorean or orphic origin. This incantation was transposed in such a language in the primitive societies.<sup>6</sup>

Canetti refers to the nature of myth which is outside time.<sup>7</sup> He believes in the cathartic and incantatory function of the institutional language of myth, as was referred to in *Phaedrus*:<sup>8</sup> a catharsis of passionate love.<sup>9</sup> This language is the structural basis of every significant experience; a real codex of points of communication.<sup>10</sup> These incantations, however, appealing to the unknown, are not enough.<sup>11</sup> The function of myth expresses this weakness and at the same time the inability of science (and art, especially) to attain the order of history: hence myth has the same function as science. They both attempt to heal the evils brought by passion and change.<sup>12</sup> The possibility of a resultant psychosis in Canetti and Gatsos is pessimistic.<sup>13</sup> In Canetti's Works we see heroes as the focal point of a world bursting into flames. Kant's name is Kin to lift the burden of the horrible outcome: Kant's library being in flames, what is left to mankind?<sup>14</sup> Canetti faces defeat as regards the incantatory use of myth to heal evil;<sup>15</sup> he himself admitting that what man most fears is the unimaginable.<sup>16</sup> Arbitrary political authority can make good use of this fear by its threat of the death penalty, in, say military societies. Neither writer succumbs to such arbitrary systems; though they bear serious traumas.

Gatsos' political thought echoes with the thought of Canetti. Elias Canetti interprets the mythical and incantatory usage of language as if it were the social context within which an evolution of institutional tension took place. This language of incantation is the realm of myth, not myth. Its essence lies outside time, outside reality; reposing in the realm of the unknown. It is improbable that communicative signs could be transformed into symbols of a mythical content which stabilize communication: they are merely signs. Myth is essentially incantatory. Myth is conditioned by attempts, often dangerous or unusual, to realise the Good. Canetti, in the same way as Gatsos, stresses the incompatibility between myth and society. Canetti's “inexplicable” is fatally so for Gatsos, because it does not lead Canetti towards the Good. It leads him to a psychosis of the Good.

Aristotle is said to have stated that we simply decide to realise the normative in the nature of spatio-temporal social and political facts, and are constrained after this decision to attempt to realise the perhaps unrealisable ideal of truth. Aristotle considers this unrealisable, yet supremely

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<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 80 b; *Charmides*, 156 d and 175 e. *The Laws*, 829 e; 887 d; 903 a and 927 a. Also, *Phaedo*, 85 a and *The Republic*, 377 a-d.

<sup>6</sup> Cazeneuve 1961, 17 and Boyancé (1937), 41, 145; also, Schuhl (1947), 9.

<sup>7</sup> Conradi (2003), 449 and 462.

<sup>8</sup> 245 b-d.

<sup>9</sup> 251-252 c.

<sup>10</sup> Kristeva (1997), 52, 84-85.

<sup>11</sup> Kristeva (1997), 142 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Lebeck (1972), 267-290; also Hackforth (1928), 39-42.

<sup>13</sup> Canetti (2004a), 292-293, 422-423.

<sup>14</sup> Canetti (1968), 606 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Canetti (2004b), 29-33.

<sup>16</sup> Canetti (1971) 11, 458.

worthy of our effort. None any longer can reach Plato's ideal of a man becoming good and happy at the same time, Aristotle mourns.<sup>17</sup> This is highlighted in his very words "For the more I am a lover of solitude the more fond of stories I become"; even "for the more I am a lover of solitude and with a great deal of philosophical insight, the more fond of stories I become". Does this mean that Aristotle suffers from mental derangement? And that he abstains from life and his sociological methodology? Or that he adopts Plato's sort of dogmatism regarding the caverns of our soul? Do they constitute the end-stop of every attempt to reach the ideal, of every ambition to make such an attempt? It seems that Aristotle embraces Plato's pessimism rather than his dogmatism. Aristotle cherishes the nature of Canetti's myth which is not restricted to a particular date or time.<sup>18</sup> Myth takes hold of us with a sort of authority, so that we cannot see things otherwise. But what does this mean? Possibly that it is a matter of personal taste and thus that it is enslaving. But is this the case with myth? Aristotle states that myth accompanies philosophical destitution. A man who is puzzled and wonders, thinks himself ignorant, he holds.<sup>19</sup> Hence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, Aristotle continues. This sense we shall trace in Gatsos's poetry now. It is in myth's composition made up of wonders that we can consider Aristotle's ideal that which cannot be otherwise. I shall not push further the argument on the nature of myth. I leave this task to historians and philosophers of art. This question belongs in the realm of aesthetics. I shall only deal here with its use, its congruity with wonder and destitution, as shown in the work of Gatsos. Nor shall I deal with an overall function of art. I leave it to sociologists of art to prove that myth is not a matter of personal taste and thus beyond argument. Because, if it is a matter of personal taste, then it accompanies arbitrary power instead of destitution and wonder. Art, then, is at odds with the methodology of myth as untamed power. Such an arbitrary use of myth suggests artistic bondage to public non-sense and tyranny. How is art possible, if we believe that myth equals power? Gatsos' poetics are a fair answer to this unavoidable challenge of our times recurrently and diachronically appearing in the history of political ideas. The artist almost always stands against the methodology of a myth that embraces power. S/he annuls this totalitarian function of art that tends to impose political power symbolically. To what extent s/he can manage to do so is another question. I am afraid I cannot offer optimistic examples of such an outcome; Gatsos approaches speculation and exploitation which is carried out at the cost of artists and artistic products. It is the powerful that exploit the vulnerable, as always happens. Artists are vulnerable; if not, they are not artists. Thus, myth is baptized as truth to serve power, arbitrariness and non-sense in society. But there is no way out. Only the incantatory nature of art can express the idea that even something which is not true in the literal historical sense, can be a constituent of an orderly life. Our commitment to the unknown, then, needs this incantatory function of myth: appeasing our hunger for the unknown and invoking harm<sup>20</sup> to untamed power. Alas, it is only an artistic tool that causes no harm to evil. Gatsos emphasises the vanity of art.<sup>21</sup> It has only a palliative function; not a curative one. There is no definite healing process regarding social evil and arbitrariness.

Having struggled with ink and hammer, he confesses in his tormented heart, all that he has managed is to make an "embroidery"; just to comfort all traumas, social traumas especially.

Paraphrasing the great poet, we could say that throughout the theatre of history, from ancient to modern times, where the ancient gods meet the personages of folklore, it is this tragic, fatally unsuccessful, procedure that always happens. We can thus envisage that function of myth: appeasing our hunger for the unknown and invoking harm to untamed power. It is obvious in myth language. Alas we see this in "a dead anemone, a ghost of a princess, the silence of towers,

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<sup>17</sup> Giouli 2012a, 81.

<sup>18</sup> Conradi 2003, 346, 354.

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A2, 982 b17-2.

<sup>20</sup> Moutsopoulos 1998, 114-115.

<sup>21</sup> Gatsos 1988, 57.

mourning tops of cypresses”; all of these accompany nonsense, arbitrariness and untamed social power in the order of history. As fitly expressed by Eugene Aranitsis,<sup>22</sup> it is as if the core of a work of art contains a seed of death. Thus, Aranitsis says, in *Amorgos* the world is made neither for joy nor for sorrow. We cannot explain the social world and history in terms of something that does not itself require to be explained as joy or sorrow. There is no order perceived thus, unless we believe in the unknown realm of values to reach the non-realistic faith in a crazy normativity.<sup>23</sup> This normativity is unstable. Gatsos’ universe thus, Aranitsis adds, is open to man’s tendency to capture images. Mental images thus cannot but undermine viewpoints on the unknown. And surely such tendencies do not belong in the realm of the logically possible.

### III. Juxtaposing Gatsos’ poetics with competing theories

Art and myth thus produce, rather than just represent, already present truths or translate already known ideas into a visual or material form, as happens in Leibniz’ ideas. The significance of art and myth may be manifold. They produce the intertwined structural opposition of body-mind. These ideas only manifest our inability to seize the unknown and our uncertainty as regards the alternatives: life at animal level or no life at all. Thus, Gatsos continues, “stupidity characterises the huntsman firing his gun at the doves”.

Within this framework of ideas, ineffectiveness qualifies all that a windmill can produce. Old age, boredom and retardation characterise the social network.

Everyone has forgotten the old windmill. Production is achieved by its rotted sails. There is little hope for these sails to be patched by anyone else but the old windmill itself.

Thus, the social outcome of this procedure lacks all vigour and revolutionary vividness of the unknown. The forces of production cannot develop beyond that social framework of production. Life is boring and cheap. It is “the wing-beat of the crane, the rust in a water-wheel that is groaning”; all of these suggest cheapness and boredom in life. We cannot avoid the fact that all our relationships are a matter of individual taste and thus beyond argument.<sup>24</sup> All relationships are deprived of the social, the institutional, the public factor.<sup>25</sup> Yet, despite the intentional factor, evil, and social evil especially, remains intact. Once again, we go back to Aristotle’s lover of stories and lover of wisdom that are equated. We are told<sup>26</sup> that the knowledge claims of the natural sciences in specific art forms can be associated with distanced observation and objective deduction. These claims are connected in a specific artwork, physically, with the pleasurable aesthetics of exhibition and the sceptical reinterpretation of scientific method by conceptual art. This aesthetic paradigm sets up further resonances between aesthetics and scientific method. The display implies that the disciplinary boundaries between the arts and the sciences cannot be so sharply drawn.

Similarly, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz<sup>27</sup> sees in these varied collections of faculties a mechanism by which to connect beauty with wonder and intellectual rigour –a manifestation, we are told, of his concept of the *Ars Combinatoria*; as do, we saw above, Aristotle and Gatsos; what is more, in their affective mode of production of thought and meaning, they make us conscious of the reduction of the mental into the physical. Gatsos cites a fragment from Heraclitus in the opening of his *Amorgos*: “eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men whose souls are savage”.

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<sup>22</sup> Aranitsis 1988, Front Page.

<sup>23</sup> Giouli 2022, 271-294.

<sup>24</sup> Gatsos 1988, 55.

<sup>25</sup> Gatsos 1988, 53.

<sup>26</sup> Meskimmon 2004, 126–127, 132.

<sup>27</sup> Leibniz 1666, 73-84.

The mind's eye here is nothing but a vulgar ostentation of the senses; hence the aforementioned reduction. Are we then to espouse materialist reductionism in philosophy of mind, or in political philosophy? It is not the individual that confronts power but a whole system of beliefs that confronts the world according to the mythical jargon we analyse here. Still, what myth contains, despite appearances to the contrary, the unknown, is clearly debased and reduced to a material status for Gatsos.

#### IV. *The Soundness of Gatsos' ideas*

With K. Palamas (b. 1859 – 1943) a Greek poet and central figure of the Greek literary generation of the 1880s and one of the cofounders of the so-called New Athenian School, and G. Theotokas (b. 1905 – 1966), a Greek novelist, a painstaking, imperfect process which cannot but be fallacious and exploited, is illustrated in Gatsos' mental images:<sup>28</sup> Man, he states, has left to his descendants various patterns which are worthy of his immortal origin. His origin might be immortal; nevertheless, it remains inexplicable, mysterious. Man can state no more about this origin. That is why, Gatsos continues, "traces of the ruins of daybreak have also been left together with snowdrifts of heavenly reptiles and paper eagles".

Evil and frustration lie together with political truth, "diamonds in the stream of a mystery of life".

Truth is something indeed very vague and indeterminate which cannot be articulated entirely. Moutsopoulos states<sup>29</sup> that a myth of conformism and a myth of contestation are deliberately expressed by a vocabulary aimed at confusion. Confusion here regards originality in the established order of aesthetic facts. Shall we rebut originality? Shall we accept it? And this confusion is due to political speculation. This has nothing to do with the very nature of myth which is the material of art and history. Myth is beyond human authority. What does this mean? Let us take a closer look. To claim that historical knowledge must relate to necessary truth would be absolute nonsense. We cannot shift the modal operator "necessarily" forward to infer that our knowledge carries some infallible logical guarantee of success.<sup>30</sup> All that this success is about regards the actual fact. To avoid an arbitrary assignment of justice-functions of our statements on peace and freedom and identity normativistic facts in the historical warfare theatre, we see that the variables to which our conclusions are reduced have non-deterministic values. We mark our subject-matter only by the existentially quantified variable. No variable means no reductionist evil. But how is this possible? The repercussions of such a complex state of power cannot be evaluated unless we believe in balance and order. This non-realistic account of history presupposes a viewpoint according to which peace, or freedom, is not an element of reality; rather, it is an ideal to be realized. However, we cannot thus avoid materialist reductionism. These ideas only respond to an "appalling" challenge in Aristotle's *Work*: Why cannot we gain epistemic access to the real essences of things? It is not within the capacity of science, Aristotle states, to tell us why nature conforms to given fixed ratios or to any given causal principle at all. This incapacity is considered by Aristotle as evidence that we must necessarily lack a recognisable concept of the ideal, the world as it is in itself. We cannot answer the question "what is it to be real"; but it would be untoward to let the outcome of scientific enquiry depend on this question –or the incapacity to answer it, in Heidegger's way. Perhaps only the criterion of relevance of what is already known, according to Aristotle, can give a definitional account of the world; not its meaning. We can grasp terms for kinds without knowing how we come to grasp them; yet, we attempt to pursue the unifying essences of the *Analytics* model and fail. Our sense of such a unifying structure of phenomena is not part of the permitted conceptual

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<sup>28</sup> Gatsos 1988, 51.

<sup>29</sup> Moutsopoulos 2005, 207, 209.

<sup>30</sup> Cottingham 1984, 20-21.

armament for playing “the proof game” – in Wittgenstein’s sense. The scientist’s task is to make sense of the world within a certain conceptual range, which does not include the ideal. Hence, Aristotle’s non-realistic account of the world. “Reality” of kinds and objects is thus reflected in our craft engagement with, and skilled demarcation of, instances of kinds. Cultivating our sense of order, as Aristotle warns us, does not mean that we can turn it real; nothing can guarantee this ideal’s realisation in Aristotle.<sup>31</sup>

Significances and viewpoints are undermined by the corresponding mental images, i.e., by myths. But myths that explain facts and our reference to them do not belong in the realm of the known, of the logically possible. Thus, it would be untoward to let such images or the lack of them depend on the outcome of historical enquiry. Myths cannot be used by historians to identify facts. No historian who wants to be taken seriously can explain the outcome of a battle as due to mythical contents that support one side or the other. Mythical doctrines lie altogether outside her/his competence. Thus, historical statements and mythical statements are too far apart to contradict or to criticise each other. Professor Liakos strongly stresses these ideas, suggesting that an historian should not give a verdict on mythical beliefs any more than s/he could produce evidence due to magical spells. We are not going to stop believing what we are, he states.<sup>32</sup> We should only rationalise about it with some dose of humour, he adds.

Establishing identities in the artistic and historical theatre thus refers directly to a weakness in language, Gatsos hints. This painstaking process relates to the vagaries of historical and artistic thought. It is in the course of certain reconstructions from nonsensical conditions where weakness of language is absent that we may find grounds for vindicating our claims to realise the ideal question game, Wittgenstein’s proof game, by asking the right question.<sup>33</sup> And Wittgenstein’s warning on getting it right about how the relevant language functions, removes all philosophical problems. The real discovery, Wittgenstein says, is that which makes us capable of stopping studying philosophy when we want to: the one that gives philosophy peace. We are then left in peace, as getting it right becomes the criterion of correctness in any account of how words really function, of what their grammar really is. This is not a criterion, which is introduced to make life easy for philosophers. So, this has to be what we are doing. Thus, the only possible criterion of correctness lies in these humble everyday judgments, which are beyond reasonable doubt as also regards Gatsos’ ideas. This is resting at peace in all possible worlds and methods of measuring in social sciences. These worlds do not contradict nor conflict with the realm which lies far apart from them; the realm of the ultimate, which we shall always feel unable to attain. So, there is no justification in this realm for us. Can it be justified as belonging in the possible worlds? The ultimate is not the possible. Hence, Wittgenstein’s stating “Do this! Think like that!” can only be considered as a call or as an invitation to explore the field of the logically impossible. Such an invitation can offer no justification in the sense of guarantees as to what we will find, or even that we will find anything at all. Those who have gone into the same field before us assure us that they did not find the realm of values empty. Aristotle has been assured by Plato that this realm is not empty.

Liakos states that history is expressed by the maturity of historians’ questions. Language, and mythical language especially, testifies to the epistemological passage from political identity to otherness; language also outlines the weakness of all attempts to leap the gulf between the “same” and the “other”.<sup>34</sup> This view of peace, identity, the endgame of controversy, is becoming less prevalent; and so is the language we use to express it, according to Gatsos. Through the

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<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 74 b2-5; 78 a35; 81 b7-10; 93 b25-28. *Topics*, 105 a13-17; 105 a22-33. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139 b26-35. Charles 1997, 243; Charles 2000, 255-264. Longeway 2007, 276-315. Cottingham 1984, 29. Ross 1949, 38. Barnes 1969, 123-152.

<sup>32</sup> Liakos 2009.

<sup>33</sup> Wittgenstein 1953, I, 124.

<sup>34</sup> Giouli 2012b, 57-82.

grammar of realism and non-realism, we learn that we can ascribe to such values the mythical endgame questioning within certain limits. Beyond these limits we can say no more: we can only assess moves within a particular game as permissible or not permissible according to the rules of the game. We can assess the rules themselves from the standpoint of prejudice and violence; what other criteria of right and wrong can be used other than what is ordinarily employed? Weakness qualifies our use of language.

We should, nonetheless, reconstruct the mythical situation outside which we cannot meaningfully ask for the realisation of values in history and art. Liakos offers us the Greek culture paradigm, so that we can easily clarify further such mythical procedures. The way we should understand today any experience of history due to Greek culture should be connected as a phenomenon with the set of brain processes that perceive the world, and the artistic world especially, as changing. Indeed, we have used thus far the term *vulnerable* to connote change in history. The lesson which Greek culture teaches us is that there is no monopoly of values within it, nor in any world culture. This lesson implies that we may produce evidence connected to human responsibility regarding the realisation of freedom beyond both physical survival and abstract, theoretical statements. Ancient Greek and Byzantine historical communities teach that basic liberties are necessary if they protect equality. Mythical and artistic languages in those times define precisely this necessity regarding personal use of such liberties. In our times it is Gatsos' artistic language that supplies us with such a necessity. We can refer to facts in mythical language only to avoid tyranny, arbitrariness and the nonsensical in the best possible way.

Gatsos offers us a radical shift in the range of mythical concepts, in what we can hope or fear. We can judge whether the new conceptual apparatus he offers, enables us to articulate the political truths which are only very dimly and uncertainly apprehended.

Have we seen that there is no material reductionism in such truths? A whole system of beliefs embraces the world, not an individual statement. Still, nothing guarantees that, however faithfully we practise them, we can arrive at their meaning. We can take refuge in Gadamer's thoughts on culture here.<sup>35</sup> Though culture is materialised in mythical horizons, the fusion of such horizons can be testified to through the medium of language. However, to see art and history as a mythological grammar rather than as an impartial enquiry does not make it easy. Impartial enquiry and mythological grammar use different conceptual equipment to identify and explain events; they frame different statements. So, they are too far apart to contradict each other. They do not simply disagree over the truth values of the same statements. Thus, if we use this grammar, we may create formidable barriers to mutual understanding and communication. But then we must acknowledge a deficiency or incapacity on our part – if we choose to adopt impartial enquiry– sharing the range of mythical concepts rather than the belittling of the concepts themselves. We must acknowledge also that such range brings out, convincingly according to Gatsos the inevitable dissatisfaction with all our conceptual apparatus; however, the criteria Gatsos offers us for assessing this dissatisfaction are plainly inexact. This inevitability of the perverted use of myth is shown in that the patterns Gatsos makes use of are left in the midst of sighs, tears, hunger, lamentations. “The ashes of wells under the earth” manifest human depravity in Aristotle's use of the term.

The abyss between the use of a mythological grammar and the use of a secular grammar is indeed too broad to be bridged. Wittgenstein refers to such an abyss. We create formidable barriers to mutual understanding and social communication. We cannot talk lightly of having an easy choice between them. Gatsos calls us<sup>36</sup> a bare vein under the frightful stare of the wind, a deaf spark among the glistening multitude of stars. No one observes us, no one stops to listen to our breathing. However, in our heavy pacing through the pride of nature we shall come one day to

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<sup>35</sup> Gadamer 2004, 303–304.

<sup>36</sup> Gatsos 1988, 45.

the leaves of the apricot tree; we shall bear the fruit of success regarding truth and normativity in art and history. One day, our attempts will last for ever. Thus, it would be misleading to talk lightly of having a free choice between myth and secular historical and artistic grammar; unless this freedom is determined by arbitrariness, the nonsensical and tyranny. Artists and historians serve political and social power. And the medium is the language that serves the dogma of political myth.

Can we hold out a moment for the dark heavens to flash?<sup>37</sup>

Impossible, he concludes.

We know, however illiterate we may be, that normative truths are not assigned to the unknown realm of values nor to social values especially. There are important differences of function between the terms and the grammar used in the language about our relationship with the realm of the unknown and those in which we speak about social relations. Thus, our normative ideas or concepts of the realm of social values and the resultant expectations about how we ought to live in relationship with this realm cannot encourage us to progress in this relationship. In the context of the sharp disjunction between the realms of the known and the unknown and, further, of the incapacity of the human being to fully grasp the mental, we see Gatsos' account of our inability to utter "ought" statements. This is due rather to our inability to pronounce such statements than to any irresponsible utterances, because part of the essential stage setting for such sentence making that obeys the logic of "ought", is missing. Thus, mythology as grammar is a grammar in the wide sense of the term. Grammar is the distinctive way in which a word is actually used in the language of which it forms part. And this is indeed a constant element among the diversity of views about the unknown, the logically impossible in art and history. Beneath the diversity of views, we find a widespread acceptance of this mythological grammar of art and history and of their related words/products. Common mythological language provides a unifying and well-respected factor in usage that will set the limits regarding the attributes we shall ascribe to the realms of the unknown, things that simply cannot be said about the historically and the artistically unknown; we can be protected from rushing headlong into tyranny, arbitrariness and the non-sensical. Alas, in vain. Is it then legitimate to understand the poet Kostis Palamas as confessing that the grammar of art and history, of poetry especially, is better served by mythology, not by any secular model of search, which is liable to mislead? A poet is deprived thus of concepts, Palamas declares below.<sup>38</sup>

This non-realistic approach<sup>39</sup> to the idea of order in art and history means that order is not something purportedly there, an element of reality, but rather an ideal that we can, if we will, turn into reality, through sounds, verses, rhymes, rhythms and measures.

Alas, this is a fatally unsuccessful attempt.

Palamas confesses that in vain does he run after incantatory sublime visions that are full of sorrow.<sup>40</sup>

What such visions, such myths can only do is to undermine viewpoints on the sublime in art and history. That is why Palamas adds that it is impossible to reach the star of truth.<sup>41</sup>

Such a non-realistic<sup>42</sup> view of history and its nurturer, our native land, in Palamas,<sup>43</sup> cannot but be betrayed by the political and social evils of the times. The same idea is used with efficacy by Gatsos.<sup>44</sup> The material of art and history, material which is myth, cannot constitute an alibi for

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<sup>37</sup> Gatsos 1988, 43.

<sup>38</sup> Moutsopoulos 2006, 198-209.

<sup>39</sup> Giouli 2019b, 133-144.

<sup>40</sup> Palamas 1904b, 118.

<sup>41</sup> Palamas 1929, 64.

<sup>42</sup> Giouli 2020a, 121-131. Giouli 2020b, 87-101.

<sup>43</sup> Palamas 1904a, 8.

<sup>44</sup> Gatsos 1998, 343.



arbitrarily exercising political power. Our political mother tongue spells power instead of taming it, Gatsos confesses in his vain attempt to defuse the dogma of political myth. Our mother Hellas has a big mouth to feed us instead of real milk. There we have the dream of a dream that is so illusory that it entails the undermining of social and historical truth. Gatsos' language is much sharper than Palamas' mellow motherly protective illusion.

I shall use one more example: the Greek novelist, scholar and politician George Theotokas. He does not hesitate for a moment to underline the nature of history as above. Mythical visions here stop being incantatory and healing regarding the evils of the times. Born from immature and blurred visions and social and political experiences, Theotokas, also a Greek lawyer and author, states, they harbour reason's unlimited power, instead of reason's vulnerability. We are thus judged, condemned, punished<sup>45</sup> and justified by all those who hold such non-sensical arbitrary and tyrannic visions, definitely and ineluctably, as if the only meaning of life could depend on such impending judgements.<sup>46</sup> This is not the task of historians, as we have already seen above; and rightly Theotokas points out that sometimes historians do make inconsistent and bizarre concluding remarks.<sup>47</sup>

It is not my intention to argue herein about barriers to historicist relativism; about Aristotelian craftsmanship as the only line of thought that examines rationalistic models of history and society. We must understand, nevertheless, that what gives these theories an abiding interest is their tragic attempt to supply us with irrefutable propositions regarding social and historical truth. But do they allow scope to pursue intellectual values through the medium of myth and language? And is it then pertinent to accuse Theotokas because he shows that the function assigned to mythical grammar that equalises power and values, that cherishes the adoption of intellectual values, is nonsensical? Again, we are terrorized here by the phantom of omnipotence. We need to stress once again the inherent vulnerability not only of power, but of science and of reason. And it is only belief in order that can enable us to reason more effectively. This does not mean that we adopt relativism and scepticism, or that we shall take refuge in an Orwellian situation in which the truth is simply whatever some authority says it is. We have already seen in Aristotle that anything in social science and reality is permanently open to question; except those humble statements that cannot be otherwise. To decide to impose order on reality means that we may be constrained or under authority, which forces us to adopt or pursue a specific ideal in order to realise social and political values. But this decision is ours to make and we could have made it otherwise. To borrow from Burke again, this is not a matter of showing by an exercise of reason that a being in space and time will be able to explain certain features of social life and reality, or of our experience of this reality. We can see that respecting the virtues of diversity is seen positively in Aristotle's thought, in that everyone should be treated with respect, allowed autonomy and accorded a voice in all decisions that affect her/him. These are radical notions too often ridiculed and falsely represented. But they can be global, adopted by collectives, communities and individuals around the world; this, thus, offers us the challenge which globalisation should respond to. Whatever lacunae this response may offer, it will provide us with a furtherance of the critique provided by Aristotle and will avoid our lapsing into scepticism and relativism, however inevitable our having institutions and rulers might be. The idea of anarchy is one of the greatest evils of our times.

Is this interpretation of challenge what Professor Dimiroulis insinuates for Gatsos? Is the poet haunted, he wonders, by a consciousness of an impasse, by a feeling of weakness, by a growing mental instability that articulates dimly the point zero of writing. We are attempting

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<sup>45</sup> Giouli 2020c, 183-196.

<sup>46</sup> Theotokas 1996, 297.

<sup>47</sup> Katsoulakos & Tsantinis 1994, 14-15.

unsuccessfully to pursue the unknown, that takes in such a use of mythical grammar; in Gatsos' Works the conventional form of an elephant means always more than a girl's breasts dancing.<sup>48</sup> We are not in danger of losing our national identity and going astray, Liakos has stated earlier. As added in the Prologue of Theotokas' Political Texts, by Professor N. Alivizatos,<sup>49</sup> Theotokas' sociological methodology regarding the empirical affirmation of the concrete fact espouses reason's vulnerability; not its omnipotence. Bearing in mind Popper here we may add that what is true is true for ever though inaccessible in its absolute measure for the human mind. Normativity in language and thought is indeed decreasing. We can only use myth to heal the evils of our time. We do not discover order and laws to be a distinctive element of reality; but we can realise this ideal in life and reality in general. Yet, there is no such necessary and ineluctable element of reality as to produce a definite balance in the world; to engender love and happiness all over it. Thus, to refer to normativistic facts in artistic or in historical language or thought we can only take refuge in myth; because the intentional is the normative.<sup>50</sup>

#### V. *A thesis on Gatsos*

Gatsos says<sup>51</sup> that this painstaking poetic procedure concerns only "those who are left and they will begin each day with a fresh-cut slice of the sun's rich bread".

Not a single space is left for mystification here, according to Gatsos. Instead, "those who are left will make the earth into a holy place and a cradle for children still unborn".

Gatsos, in such a mythological grammar of historical and artistic good, wishes to protect artistic and historical values; alas in vain.<sup>52</sup>

"The sun remains black, and the clear sky remains unreal; freedom's lily flower is given to luckless friends in bitterness. We may thus kneel on the slopes of pain and weep for the victims death consumes".

Revolutions in art and history are rare. The whole business here for measuring the results of the efficiency of mythological language regarding the protection of values is dismal.

Mental visions can be the normative here. What triggers the intentional belongs in the realm of the unknown.<sup>53</sup> Humankind may or may not survive the hunger and the materialist destitution caused by Wars. The unpredictability of the job market occurs. We must face the impending danger of death, the terrible fear of the unknown.

It is only by the incantatory grammar of mythical language that we may glimpse the unknown realm of values. We can very dimly articulate and acknowledge anything which is related to the realm of intellectual values. Thus, the ideal is not totally impossible to attain, according to Theotokas. We can aim to create, he continues, a sum of concrete measures organising economy on a national and international level. We can decrease inequality through social control of the means of production. Can we achieve this? It remains indeterminate for Theotokas; that is why we guess here that Theotokas implies the defusing of political myth. His way is not too far apart from Gatsos' way, I may add, if I interpret him correctly.

Only a few words more are necessary about Theotokas. I borrow from Alivizatos his quotation that such a rationalism that cherishes that truth is beyond human authority, annuls reason's omnipotence. This rationalism is fastened to a mind opened to change, thus being vulnerable. Otherwise, the dogma of political myth and all its evil consequences remains intact. Fuzzy minds

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<sup>48</sup> Gatsos 1988, 25. Dimiroulis 2011.

<sup>49</sup> Alivizatos 1996, 67-69.

<sup>50</sup> Wedgwood 2007, 161-173.

<sup>51</sup> Gatsos 2000a, 185. Vonaparti 2003, 21. Potamianou 2006, 7-9. Moutsopoulos 2006, 245-247.

<sup>52</sup> Gatsos 2000b, 184.

<sup>53</sup> Giouli 2012a, 77-134.

cordially espouse it and the concomitant rational results that are guaranteed by the arbitrariness of such a use. It is only a commitment to the grammar of myth that can make reason's results more fully attainable. Mythology thus, as the grammar of the artistic and historical unknown, can only teach us that our attributes can be ascribed to such realms only within certain limits. There are certain things that are simply not said about this realm. However humble or unlettered we may be, we would be very quickly aware of something wrong and react with dismay and outrage if the dogmas of political myths remained active. Theotokas underlines this awareness.<sup>54</sup> It is a matter of whether there can be any criteria of right and wrong here other than what is ordinarily accepted by writers, artists and historians. Education and political communication make absolutely clear the above-mentioned limits and those indubitable truths of everyday life and reality in general. Social and political values, then, need no affirmation or denial, and certain manifestations are refutable without a second thought. That is why Theotokas adds that the role of the artist is precursory in her/his attempts to reach the ideals in question. S/he is in search of cultural identities, while s/he tries to solve the problems of language that are tied to the aforementioned use of mythical grammar. But we saw that this is a fatally unsuccessful attempt; how can s/he balance this with the illusions we mentioned before and with all kinds of demons of psychoanalysis? Theotokas is very well aware here of the impasses of a non-arbitrary use of myth in art and history. However, the arbitrary use of the dogma of political myth by scholars and historians entails in exchange subjective and partial benefits of power distribution. Theotokas,<sup>55</sup> like an ancient Aristotelian craftsman, says of the writer that s/he must adopt an attitude above life and death, even if we complain that the focus to the realm of the unknown has been left altogether too vague and indeterminate. In such a sick world we must try to protect solidarity, compassion and tolerance, we add together with him. Otherwise the arbitrary use of myth will be fatal for mankind. Such arbitrary procedures suggest evil aesthetic sentiments with an evil aesthetic understanding. The medium here, the faulty language container in use, is anodyne. But this does not make it less effective. We have thus, we paraphrase Moutsopoulos,<sup>56</sup> a whole bunch of charlatans, of magicians, of heroes of science. We also have self-pronounced scholars, caricatures of prophets that remain either uncompromised or victims. In fact, they are not intellectually sufficient. Moutsopoulos adds that they survive because the mechanisms described above that favour all these impostures function infallibly. Within certain limits, we can ascribe mythological meaning to historical and artistic values. Our effort to define the meaning presupposes the attributes we shall use. Mystification is the instrument that implies the evil use of myth in art and history, he concludes. We may indicate at this point how Theotokas emphasises such procedures. He mentions an arbitrary religious background of mystification that moves irrational feelings about a philosophy of history that cherishes power instead of taming it. Perverted power suggests however, Theotokas adds, perverted history that serves arbitrariness and vague theories of history. And perverted myths thus become the indisputable containers of such a perverted historical intentionality.

We do not speak of a handful of those that abstain from the evil, arbitrary use of language to serve arbitrary power and the non-sensical. We do not challenge the likelihood or unlikelihood of their being right. We must wonder, however, whether there can be any criteria of rightness and wrongness here other than what is habitually or ordinarily accepted. In Plato the revolutionary, say, is reducible to the unknown; it is inspired by the realm of values. This suggests an overwhelming effort for human nature. Thus, every linguistic effort brings out our weakness to grasp the unknown, the ideal pattern to which existing societies should aspire and against which they should be measured. Here we shall measure the distance between the known

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<sup>54</sup> Theotokas 1996, 703, 704, 711.

<sup>55</sup> Theotokas 1996, 986.

<sup>56</sup> Moutsopoulos 2006, 160-197. Theotokas 1996, 20.

and the unknown; what we can do and what we cannot do. But is not the real the physical? Does not the mental penetrate the physical? Otherwise, there is no point in culture's materialisation in space. Plainly, we do not refer to Plato. We speak<sup>57</sup> here of a radical shift of viewpoint regarding what facts we shall identify and what values we shall pursue; this is what will make the difference more than the distance between facts and values. We cannot view the impossible from the angle of the possible.

It is thus mythical statements that accomplish superior functions. These linguistic functions relate to the meaningful activation of the said procedures. Mental images undermine, however, viewpoints and significances; they are incantatory. They are cathartic regarding the solution of evils. Wild thoughts and heart's lament can thus be tamed, Gatsos adds.<sup>58</sup> This solution certainly belongs in the realm of the atopic or of the magic. No honeysuckle blossomed, no nightingale sang, Gatsos says; no Antigone led blind Oedipus by the hand in Colonos where the poet says he often walks the roads. The Good cannot be served by social imaginary meanings. Evils of the time are not healed; they cannot but be undermined. Certainly, nothing can heal the wounds that the new, the unknown implies. A language that depicts such passion and destitution is mythical. It tends to become a container of the unknown; it ends, however, in the fatally unsuccessful area of vulnerability, agony, pain.

The poet clarifies such a function referring to a boy studying the sages' wonderland. "The boy saw hills greening in the deep abyss; and love dance with death round the gates of horn". His eyes are magic among ancient books, Gatsos continues. Can we, however, be given his glance and be told where to find a flickering of light and a glimmering of hope? I am afraid the answer is no even if we descry above time the individual's horoscope as the boy does. Gatsos offers a prayer to a humble and blessed myrtle tree<sup>59</sup> to help him to find paradise, that is water and earth for the lovebird's nest.

Is it impossible to find specific truths about some humble everyday matter like the number of things on the table before us? It seems that it is; since Gatsos confesses that at the wide windows the myrtle tree cries as he sets his sails for paradise.

Thus, we can view the unlimited vista of our inability to ever attain truth and political values that defuse and tame power and political power, especially, via the mythical container and its concomitant language. We are chasing after values that are not within reach; without being able to entirely defuse the dogma of political myth and thus tame power.

We are like restless hunters, Gatsos continues,<sup>60</sup> from the generation of heroes, until one day we too will vanish with all the dark forms that assist in such workings. In the river caves will then resound with heavy hammers of patience, he adds.

Mastering the ideal society will not be totally impossible, we state, since Gatsos says that such hammers are not for rings and swords but for pruning-knives and ploughs. We are crusaders of the impossible.<sup>61</sup>

But in what does this crusade and its expression in language consist of? It is only through everyday language that we can manage it. According to Nussbaum, Aristotle's tremendous interest in ordinary language and belief is indisputable. Here<sup>62</sup> we are presented freed of contradictions, since we try to decide which of our beliefs are more basic and more central than others. We see that necessary truths here do not conform to the unknown, the impossible. We can never lay any claim to absolute knowledge in social life and reality in general. And the whole of philosophy seems to be confined to the surface of things. Aristotle starts from the familiar and

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<sup>57</sup> Theodorakopoulos, 1970<sup>5</sup>, 358.

<sup>58</sup> Gatsos 2000c, 186.

<sup>59</sup> Gatsos 2000d, 184-185.

<sup>60</sup> Gatsos 2000e, 182-183.

<sup>61</sup> Noica 1988, 106-109. Moutsopoulos 1988, 152-153.

<sup>62</sup> Giouli 2012a, 187.

always returns to it in the end. Then we are confined to the surface both of the world and of our experience. It is an experience we share with others in the historical and social communities in which we live, trying to attribute to it a meaning through speech and common discourse. And if we attempt thus to resolve contradictions, it is by means of some given absolute premises which affect our syllogisms. Thus, Aristotle stresses the fact that social reality cannot be a common field permanently open for all to account for; unless we have found ourselves unsatisfied with the results of such enquiries.

Still, every sentence has meaning not as an instrument of nature. What reality we account for depends, we saw, on the functions which we assigned to our statements as being true or false. This implies convention, to paraphrase Aristotle, in the particular mode of assessment which we follow. Not all sentences, however, can be called propositions: we call propositions only those that have truth or falsity in them. A myth for instance can neither be refuted nor proved true. Thus, we may wonder together with Burke<sup>63</sup> that a statement that a certain group of language users adopt a certain mythological rule is empirical. We could conceivably have got it wrong, yet a statement of the rule itself, as given, say, to a learner of the historical game or the language game is necessary and admits of no conceivable exceptions. What is the character of our investigation when we try to find out whether or not C is a criterion for S, or of our statement if we say that it is? Are we stating something logically necessary or merely the empirical fact discovered by observation? How then are the relevant mythological terms actually used? We end with our concern for the limits regarding the possibilities of language to reach absolute truth; these limits are testified to in the medium of myths, narratives, fairy tales, folk songs and popular fables. Once again, we must stress that repetitiveness in incantatory mythical language cannot and does not depict definitely the nature of the Good. The imaginary products of the Good remain imperfect copies of the nature of the Good. And the same holds for the insufficiency of mythical symbols. The products of such imagery are like black grass in our backyard, Gatsos states.<sup>64</sup> It is only worms that come out.<sup>65</sup> They deride the stars, they mock them.

This is how we make the evil use of political myth for exploitation; not for taming power in society and in our social relations. This is indeed a cheap, futile, hopeless life that together with its products depraves. Aristotle knows this well.

Lamentation is useless, Gatsos adds in accordance with Aristotle, undermining the nightmarish mythical framework of language that manifests weakness in defining the meaning of our political and social relationships. Do these bear any values at all? Alas, Gatsos says, everywhere life will be the same, with the flute of the serpents in the country of ghosts.<sup>66</sup>

True, we are able to seek and find specific truths about some humble everyday matters like the number of things on the table before us. However, there have been powerful elements in twentieth century philosophy to argue that a general idea about reality, as in the statement that all reality is matter, is necessarily the result<sup>67</sup> of misunderstanding. The relations of production, Urry claims,<sup>68</sup> are comprised not just of relations of person-to-person, group-to-group, class-to-class. Marx's material worlds, Urry adds, are never the outcome of social processes alone. The notion that social ordering is indeed simply social disappears. What we see, Urry states, is that the social is materially heterogeneous; talk, bodies, texts, machines, architectures, all of these and many more are implicated in and perform the social. All that is built or all that is natural, he adds following Marx, melts into image. This does not mean, we comment, that the mental here is the physical. We have already spoken of the images that undermine the significance of

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<sup>63</sup> Burke 1983, 633-634.

<sup>64</sup> Gatsos 1988, 41.

<sup>65</sup> Gatsos 1988, 39.

<sup>66</sup> Gatsos 1988, 37.

<sup>67</sup> Burke 2000, 84.

<sup>68</sup> Giouli 2012a, 212.

history, society and social reality in general in Marx. This melting into image in the contemporary global economies of signs and space, according to Urry, is the only explanation for the nature of normative facts and our reference to them. We have no answers regarding the above-mentioned identification. If we dismiss the unknown vested in the myth, we shall espouse tyranny.

If we reject the dead, as Heraclitus says,<sup>69</sup> the sky shall turn pale.

We shall miss all. Thus, of necessity we must become involved, accept the idea of our mortality, our weakness. This encounter takes place on the level ground or in the depths of our experience.<sup>70</sup> This relates to our encounter with intellectual and political values – “as the wolf comes down from the woods to see the dog’s carcass and to weep”. Nothing can obliterate such mortality, such a carcass.

We, too, like Heraclitus, should lie down to kiss our own dead body on the hospitable earth; despite the fact that we can only lay claim to specific truths like the cattle of the Achaeans in the fat meadows of Thessaly that graze thriving and strong in the everlasting sun that watches them. They eat green grass, leaves of poplar, parsley. They drink clean water in the channels, Gatsos says. They smell the sweat of the earth and later fall down heavily in the shade of the willow and sleep.

Any secular models of search are liable to mislead, unless they are mythical ones; however, they are badly used in powerful hands. There is no such unifying factor as art, poetry and history in our study of neo-Hellenic society, we may confess together with Agathí Dimitroúka.<sup>71</sup> We have behaved like vulgar, arrogant and evil people with painful consequences in all fields, especially in that of education. Forthcoming generations will be paid as mercenary soldiers of a new super-power. Gatsos, she continues, was embittered, not angry. He had foreseen the bad omen from a pragmatist angle.<sup>72</sup> This pragmatism is the only healing of soul. Regardless of what Gatsos thought of social conditions and the concomitant evils that take advantage of them to establish tyranny, arbitrariness and the non-sensical, we can resist chasing hazard, the contingent. How far, however? Can we? Gatsos asks,<sup>73</sup> returning to the nightmarish framework mentioned before. An evil consciousness that exploits political myths to establish evil in society through art and history is likely to arise.

“Mice may cross over into another cellar that they may enter other churches to eat altars”. They cut off a priest’s whiskers, he continues, with the yataghan of Kolokotronis, an almost saintly person. “They laugh at witches”.

Within a scientific proof game, it is a permissible move to say that there is no explanation for witchcraft.<sup>74</sup> Such concepts are not used by scientists or historians to identify social and political events. We cannot explain the events in their order as due to witchcraft (and then laugh at it). Such concepts are not part of the permitted equipment for playing the historical proof game.

### *Concluding Remarks*

Truth is beyond human authority.<sup>75</sup> That is why Gatsos teaches us not to “become predestined”.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Gatsos 1988, 35.

<sup>70</sup> Burke 1995, 74, 96.

<sup>71</sup> Dimitroúka 2011.

<sup>72</sup> Dimitroúka 2010, 169–170.

<sup>73</sup> Gatsos 1988, 29.

<sup>74</sup> Burke 1995, 26.

<sup>75</sup> Giouli 2012c, 15.

<sup>76</sup> Gatsos 1988, 27.

In his mythical jargon this implies precisely our human inability to attain Truth and values, to disengage them from power and authority and defuse the dogma of political myth. Myth and all language containers can help us to acknowledge the inexplicable and beware of the limits of what can be answered. Thus, myth is inculcated through rites and ceremonies which aimed at the social cohesion of populations. We have seen that myths are remodelled, enriched and renewed with the synergy of discourse and art to be used as poetic material and as a political and educational tool, since they are no longer treated as actual history.<sup>77</sup> The question is whether this cohesion means manipulation and exploitation. We have found for Gatsos in the course of this work good grounds for claiming that this manipulation, commonly though it occurs, may in some cases be avoided. What triggers our mental images to activate inductively a certain significance which rests upon certain ultimate points of logic, remains impossible to grasp. We cannot expect from Aristotle the slightest hint that we can change in this direction; however hard we try to achieve this, we shall be frustrated. But are intellectual forms really present in perceptible forms? Apart from this just-within-the-bounds-of-possibility presence, nothing more is claimed in Aristotle. *We can only generalize about this presence.* Thus, truth is beyond human authority. We see here that politics solely can substantiate attempts to defuse power, paradoxically, through the use of a material reductionist language. The best possible way for doing this is through myths, in which language is used in order to depict facts. This regards Plato's Works, where concepts (the fathers) impress themselves, like “rubber-stamps” or like “moulds” upon space, the “receptacle” (the mother) of history, in order to generate sensible things. Likewise, the language of myth is empty of concepts, because concepts simply “impress themselves”<sup>78</sup> through the substratum of language in order to materialise history and thus maintain social and political bonds intact. An arbitrary use of myth to account for a truth within the bounds of an authoritarian state power suggests nonsense and tyranny; far from being qualified as art, it only qualifies cheap, political speculation, which is necessarily the result of misunderstanding that inevitably accompanies all relationships that cherish untamed power and snobbery.<sup>79</sup> It is the task of social scientists to alleviate the burden; also that of artists being exploited by the state power. How can this happen? What can assist in such attempts? There is no answer in Gatsos except our interpreting his poetry from Aristotle's angle of the vulnerability of reason which allows some scope to dimly see the unknown realm of values.

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<sup>77</sup> Tsangari 2011, 20–25.

<sup>78</sup> Popper (1966), 211, n. 15 (3).

<sup>79</sup> Tsoumas (2012), 37-42, 116–117, 122–123, 124–125, 140–141, 152–153 and 156–157.

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